In this paper, we combine the strategic delegation approach of FershtmanJudd-Sklivas with contests. Here a contest means the expenditure of resources in order to influence the allocation of a fixed demand for a certain product. At the first stage of the game, firm owners decide on incentive schemes for their managers. At the second stage, managers choose the firms' resource expenditures. These expenditures determine the firms' market shares via a logit-form contest. Depending on the incentive schemes, at the second stage the managers act as players in a possibly asymmetric contest for which a unique Nash equilibrium is derived. If the number of firms is larger than two, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium will exist in the two-stage delegation game. We also introduce the possibility of merging at an initial stage where owners are allowed to buy and shut down their rivals' firms. The resulting merged subgame perfect equilibria show that there is clearly more merging under contest than under Cournot competition. 
Introduction
In large firms, particularly in public corporations, there is a separation of ownership and control. Managerial theories of the firm and agency theory have emphasized that this separation leads to inefficiencies due to asymmetric information and differing objectives of managers and owners (e.g., Williamson 1964 , Jensen and Meckling 1976 , Fama and Jensen 1983 . On the other hand, a growing literature on strategic delegation has highlighted that owners will profit from delegating decisions to managers if delegation serves as a self-commitment device (Fershtman 1985 , Vickers 1985 . For example, when firms compete against each other in oligopoly, owners may wish their firms to act more aggressively. This objective can be realized by delegating decisions to a manager and putting a positive weight on sales in his incentive scheme. In this case managers are not hired because they are experts in managing a firm, but because an owner wants to commit himself not to act as a profit-maximizing player in the market.
Strategic delegation games usually consist of two stages -the first stage where managerial compensation is chosen by the owners, and the second stage where the managers compete in an oligopolistic market. Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) consider Cournot and Bertrand competition at the second stage. In practice, however, many competitive situations are much better described by oligopolistic contests. For example, firms have to spend resources in advance to compete for a highly profitable order from a public institution or from a private corporation. Alternatively, firms invest resources for advertising to obtain large market shares (Schmalensee 1976 (Schmalensee , 1992 1 . Firms often compete in R&D contests (e.g., Loury 1979) or are frequently involved in litigation contests for brand names or patent rights (e.g., Wärneryd 2000) . As a further example, we can think of oligopolistic competition in new markets, which often looks like a contest. In such markets, it is important for firms to implement a new technical standard as a firstmover to realize network externalities (Besen and Farrell 1994) . Successful competitors (like Microsoft, for example) can be labelled contest winners, whereas less successful firms can be described as contest losers. Either example characterizes a highly competitive situation in which each firm has sunk expenditures irrespective of the outcome of the competition. In these cases, oligopolistic competition is far better modelled by a contest than by Cournot or Bertrand competition.
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we want to combine the FershtmanJudd-Sklivas approach with contest competition and ask what the optimal incentives for managers will look like in this alternative form of oligopoly. In the models of Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) the owners choose a linear combination of profits and sales as incentive scheme for their managers. In the case of Cournot competition, each owner puts a positive weight on sales, whereas in the Bertrand model owners prefer negative weights on sales. We take the same incentive scheme as Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas, but replace Cournot or Bertrand competition with a logit-form contest. 2 We can show that there are parallels, but also strong differences to Cournot and 1 E.g. according to Scherer (2000) , advertising expenditures are very high in the pharmaceutical industry. 2 The literature on logit-form contests builds on Tullock (1980) . For applications in industrial organization, see the above cited literature.
Bertrand competition. On the one hand, like in the Cournot model, a symmetric equilibrium exists in which the owners put a positive weight on sales.
On the other hand, in contrast to both Cournot and Bertrand competition and despite a completely symmetric market structure there also exists, in duopoly, a continuum of asymmetric equilibria in which one owner puts a positive weight on sales and the other one a negative weight. In addition, there is a symmetric equilibrium for the duopoly case in which both owners choose pure profit maximization. Another difference to Cournot competition arises from the introduction of possible mergers. We show that there is more merging under contest than under Cournot competition.
Second, the model can be used to explain real market behavior. In recent years, the markets for gas and electricity and the telecommunication market have been deregulated in Germany and other European countries. As a consequence, a small number of private firms now enter these markets at the same time. They use a lot of advertising expenditures to fight aggressively for market shares. This competitive situation can be described by a contest model. Our results show that delegation in contests leads to a symmetric equilibrium in which all owners choose a sales-oriented compensation for their managers in order to make them more aggressive (see Proposition 3). Thereby, all managers spend immense resources to acquire large market shares. In addition, the theoretical results show that aggressive behavior is highest for a small number of competitors (see Eq. (11) of Proposition 3).
This fits quite well with the stylized facts for the deregulated markets which are only entered by few large competitors. The symmetric equilibrium result may also be used to explain the excessive spending of resources by the so-called dotcom firms in recent years. In this case, competition has become so strong that managers are given incentives for a more aggressive behavior so that they mainly care about sales than about profits. In our paper, competition is modelled as a logit-form contest. For an explicit modelling of the dotcom industry, Noe and Parker (2000) use an all-pay auction, which describes a stronger form of competition since it leads to a higher degree of rent dissipation.
Third, we want to compare our findings with the existing results on delegation in contests. Baik and Kim (1997) also study delegation in contests, but in their paper incentive schemes are exogenously given. In the model by Wärneryd (2000) , delegation reduces equilibrium resource expenditures which is in stark contrast to our results. As we will explain below, this is due to a limited-liability assumption imposed by Wärneryd. This assumption results in a rent earned by agents which will make delegation more costly. Baik (2003) considers delegation in a two-player asymmetric logit-form contest and also introduces a limited-liability constraint. Konrad et al.(1999) discuss delegation in an all-pay auction and show that with delegation owners can achieve positive profits. In Schoonbeek (2002) , one risk averse player delegates his decisions and chooses stronger incentives, the higher his risk aversion to insure himself against loosing the contest.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the basic model is described. In Section 3, we solve the basic two-stage game. Section 4 deals with merging in contests with strategic delegation. Section 5 concludes.
The Basic Model
In the first part of the paper, we consider a two-stage model with n (n ≥ 2)
firms in which each firm consists of an owner and its manager who are both risk neutral. At the first stage (compensation stage), each owner i has to decide on an incentive scheme for his manager i (i = 1, . . . , n). At the second stage (contest stage), each manager i observes all chosen incentive schemes. 3 After that, the managers compete for market shares by spending their firms' resources µ i ≥ 0 given in monetary terms. Resources µ i include all direct expenditures -in particular, advertising expenditures -that are used to improve firm i's relative market position. As in Schmalensee (1976 Schmalensee ( , 1992 , for example, this competition is modelled as a logit-form contest: let S > 0 denote the total market volume of sales (i.e., the market size), which is exogenously determined (e.g., by the given number of customers). Then firm i's share in total sales, s i , is described by
(1) Schmalensee (1972 Schmalensee ( , 1976 points out that this logit-form is widely applied in empirical work on advertising competition. Moreover, following Levitan and Shubik (1980, pp. 192-199 ) the logit-form contest can be used as a reduced form for a two-stage game in which -at given prices -demand is determined by advertising expenditures according to a logit allocation formula at stage 1, and then equilibrium prices are set independently of advertising at stage 3 Otherwise, there would be serious problems with delegation working as a selfcommitment device. See Katz (1991) and Bagwell (1995) , but also Bonanno (1992) and Kalai and Fershtman (1997) .
2. Such a separation of advertising and price decisions is reached by defining individual demand as a product of two functions one of which -the logit formula -measuring the impact of the firms' advertising and the other one the impact of firms' prices.
According to Eq. (1), firm i's share in S depends on the resources spent by all firms. 4 The more resources manager i spends relative to the other managers, the higher will be firm i's market share. Altogether, S i = s i · S describes the sales, µ i the costs, and Π i = S i − µ i the profits of firm i. The owner's objective is to maximize these profits. The manager's utility function is assumed to be linearly increasing in his monetary income. Furthermore, if two different resource decisions of the manager, µ 1 i and µ 2 i , lead to the same income, then he will always prefer the higher resource expenditure. This assumption is introduced for two reasons. First, it is a very weak way of modelling that managers like to be "empire builders". Second, it helps to rule out implausible preemptive equilibria in which firms choose α i = 0, such that a manager bears no costs for resource expenditures at all. Following Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) , it is assumed that owner i chooses a linear combination of profits (Π i ) and sales (S i ) as incentive scheme at the first stage:
with α i ≥ 0. As in Fershtman and Judd (1987) , the manager's total compen-4 Here we have described a situation where firms compete in advertising expenditures which determine the firms' market shares. In contrast to this, in the above mentioned example about new markets competition with network externalities, we would have a winner-takes-all situation. S would correspond to the winner prize (e.g., when becoming a monopolist) and s i to the winning probability of firm i.
sation package is given by
where A i and B i are chosen by owner i so that the manager's compensation just equals his reservation value. 5 It is assumed that this reservation value is zero so that it will always pay for an owner to delegate decisions. Note that in equilibrium the owner will earn the whole surplus s i S − µ i as a manager's participation constraint will always be binding. Hence, in the following we only have to care about the effect of α i on the managers' choice of µ i .
According to Eq. (1), α i < 1 (α i > 1) means that owner i puts a positive (negative) weight on sales whereas α i = 1 induces pure profit maximization.
Substituting for S i and Π i in Eq. (1) we can rewrite the incentive scheme for manager i as
Therefore, by choosing his incentive variable α i , owner i directly influences his manager's "cost function" at the contest stage. If owner i chooses a low (high) value for α i , he will make the use of the firm's resources cheap (expensive) for his manager which results in a more (less) aggressive behavior of manager i in the contest.
Of course, in the given framework each owner is able to manage the firm himself. But as Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas have shown, delegation may be quite useful for commitment reasons. In the next section, we will solve this basic two-stage game to compare the optimal incentive scheme with the findings of Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas. If the optimal α i s are different from 1, delegation 5 Note that the given incentive scheme characterizes all possible contracts that are linear in profits and sales. Let, e.g.,
as a self-commitment device is also useful in oligopolistic contests. Where possible we will also discuss parallels to the existing literature on delegation in contests.
It is important to note that -beyond the application introduced above -an alternative specification can be given instead of the linear FershtmanJudd-Sklivas type incentive scheme without altering our results. As is wellknown, the market share s i can be interpreted as the probability of winning in a winner-takes-all contest. Suppose that only the fact is verifiable whether a firm has won the contest and that the resource expenditures are borne directly by the agent. 6 In that case, a complete contract offered by a principal consists of an up-front transfer and a payment in case of winning. Note that any owner i will optimally set the up-front transfer such that the participation constraint is binding and, hence, his equilibrium payoff is s i S − µ i , exactly as above. If we denote the prize paid to the agent in case of winning by ρ i , the agent's utility when choosing expenditures µ i will be the sum of the up-front transfer and s i ρ i − µ i . Hence, the only purpose of ρ i (as that of α i in our original specification) is to determine the aggressiveness of the manager. Any result obtained on the optimal value of α i in the remainder of the paper can be translated to a result for the alternative interpretation because by simply
the same optimal values of µ i will arise.
6 Such a setting has been analyzed by Wärneryd (2000) with the key difference that in his paper the agent operates under limited liability.
Delegation in Oligopolistic Contests
We start by considering the game played among the managers at the contest stage given their respective incentive schemes (3). Manager i's best response to the resource expenditures of the other managers is then described by the solution of
Note that the second stage corresponds to an asymmetric contest between n players with possibly differing marginal costs of resource expenditures. Hillman and Riley (1989) have analyzed such asymmetric contests and characterized the set of players with positive contributions. 7 Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) have shown uniqueness of equilibrium in asymmetric contests including nonlinear production functions, Cornes and Hartley (2002) give a simpler proof of uniqueness. Neither of those articles explicitly computes equilibrium strategies for the n-player case (n > 2). We extend the analysis by characterizing the managers' equilibrium contributions explicitly for the contest success function specified in (4).
For ease of notation define M ≡ P j µ j as total resource expenditures and M −i ≡ P j6 =i µ j as the resources spent by all competitors of firm i. From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of program (4) we obtain
For all managers choosing strictly positive values for µ i we therefore must have that in equilibrium the ratio α i / M −i must be the same and equal to S/M 2 . For all other managers who "stay out of the market" the ratio α i / M −i has to be larger or equal than S/M 2 .
We can solve this (in)equality for µ i to obtain manager i's reaction function:
To find an equilibrium we must solve this system of n equations. Of course, it may be the case that not all managers spend strictly positive amounts of resources. Let H ⊆ {1, .., n} be the subset of active firms whose managers spend strictly positive resources. For ease of notation define A ≡ P j∈H α j and A −i ≡ P j∈H\{i} α j . For a given vector of incentive parameters (α 1 , α 2 , ..., α n ) the following result characterizes the Nash equilibria of the contest stage: subset is
The managers with the n − m highest α i do not spend any resources. For the α i s of the managers contributing positive amounts the following condition holds:
All managers with A −i ≤ (m − 2) α i stay out of the market and choose µ i = 0.
The managers with the two lowest α i always contribute a strictly positive amount.
Proof: see Appendix.
The results of Proposition 1 show that only the most aggressive managers (i.e., the ones with the lowest α i s) will choose positive contributions in the contest whereas the other managers drop out of the market by spending zero resources. According to Eq. (7), the owners can not only directly influence the behavior of their managers, but also the behavior of the other firms' managers. In particular, by choosing a low value for the incentive variable at the compensation stage, owner i makes his manager more aggressive in the subsequent contest.
Note that this result implies an algorithm by which a second-stage equilibrium can be computed. To do this, one simply has to sort the incentive variables α i . Without loss of generality, take α 1 < α 2 < ... < α n . We know that the two managers with the lowest α i s will always choose positive resources. Hence, we start off with the third, checking condition (8) for i = 3
and H = {1, 2}. If it is met, we will continue with i = 4 and check condition (8) for H = {1, 2, 3} and so on, until the condition is violated. Now suppose that there is a situation in which at least one firm has chosen α i = 0: if any other manager chooses µ j > 0, manager i will choose an infinite amount of (free) resources to maximize his market share. If all other managers choose µ j = 0, then any amount of resources will yield the same income for the manager. However, he will still spend infinite resources as he prefers higher to lower expenditures when his income level is kept constant.
Of course, an owner will therefore never choose α i = 0 at the first stage:
Proposition 2 There is no subgame perfect equilibrium of the delegation game in which α i is zero for at least one firm i.
We now look for pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with α i > 0 for all firms i. Owner i's profits are given by
where the equilibrium resource expenditures (µ 1 , µ 2 , ..., µ n ) are determined by the results of Proposition 1 for given incentive parameters (α 1 , α 2 , ..., α n ) .
Each owner i chooses α i to maximize his profits by taking into account the incentive parameters set by his competitors and the resulting Nash equilibrium in the contest subgame. We can show that indeed pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria exist. Furthermore, if n > 2 the equilibrium is unique and symmetric as is shown in the following result:
Proposition 3 If n > 2, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists which is symmetric. At the first stage, each owner chooses an incentive variable
At the second stage, each manager spends resources
Each owner's equilibrium profits are given by
If n = 2, a continuum of equilibria exists where α * 1 + α * 2 = 2 and 0 < α * 1 , α * 2 < 2 with equilibrium resource expenditures and profits
Hence, the model makes a clear-cut prediction for n > 2. However, for n = 2 there is a multiplicity of equilibria in which the best response function of owner i is given by 2 − α j such that the best response to an aggressive opponent (α j < 1) is choosing a less aggressive incentive scheme for the own manager (α i > 1). It is of course interesting to ask which of these equilibria is the most plausible one. The answer to this question is of importance when we look at possible equilibrium configurations in the subsequent section where we endogenize the number of firms by adding a merger stage before the delegation game.
A simple and straightforward refinement in this symmetric game is of course to impose symmetry in strategies. In that case, we obtain a unique symmetric equilibrium prediction where both firms choose α i = α j = 1 and both managers maximize profits. 9 To give a further argument in favor of this symmetric equilibrium, consider an extended game where owners can initially decide publicly whether to delegate decisions to a manager. When owner i decides against delegation he acts as a manager with α i = 1, and j's best response would be accordingly to choose α j = 1. In that case, only the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which α i = α j = 1 survives.
In the case of bilateral delegation with possibly asymmetric outcomes, the owner i with the higher value of α i (and hence α i > 1) would make profits
. He would thus always deviate and decide not to delegate which assures profits . 10 Note that for n = 2 the value for the incentive parameter α in the symmetric case corresponds to α * given by Eq.
(10), and resource expenditures µ * and profits Π * can be computed by Eqs.
(11) and (12). Hence, we can apply those results for all values of n in the subsequent section.
Proposition 3 implies that delegation indeed makes firms more aggressive:
without delegation (i.e., α i = 1 in (7)), each firm will choosê
but this is strictly less than the resources chosen by the managers in case of 9 Note that the best response functions for the game with n = 2 correspond to those in a Nash demand game, which also has multiple equilibria. Young (1993) has analyzed the Nash demand game in an evolutionary framework in which the symmetric equilibrium arises as a stable outcome. 10 Note that this logic does not apply to the case of n > 3 firms such that the symmetric equilibrium given remains when delegation is endogenous. In that case, an owner who chooses not to delegate is always worse off.
It is furthermore interesting to analyze the impact of delegation on profits.
Without delegation the profits of each owner can be computed by insertinĝ µ according to (13) into (9)
Subtracting the profits in case of delegation, which are described by Eq. (12),
Hence, in our model the n owners are collectively worse off by delegating decisions to managers. Nevertheless, the delegation decision is individually rational: if all owners but i do not delegate decisions (i.e., α k = 1, ∀k 6 = i), owner i's profits will be
The first-order condition ∂Π i /∂α i = 0 leads to
Therefore, with the exception of the duopoly case owner i will hire a manager and put a positive weight on sales as a best response, if all other owners do not delegate. Hence, we have a prisoner's-dilemma like situation here. For each owner delegating is strictly dominant, but all owners together will be better off, if each one does not delegate.
Proposition 3 offers some parallels to the findings of Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) for Cournot competition at the second stage. In analogy to Cournot competition, strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests also leads to a symmetric equilibrium where each owner usually puts a positive weight on sales (i.e., α * i < 1) to make his manager more aggressive. In addition, like in Theorem 4 of Fershtman and Judd (1987) α * i → 1 as n approaches infinity. Hence, similar to the result of Fershtman and Judd, for n → ∞ we have a perfectly competitive market where each owner chooses pure profit maximization as an incentive scheme and realizes zero profits (see (12)). Recall that α * i = 1 is equivalent to the case of an entrepreneurial firm which is managed by the owner himself. In other words, in this situation there are no strategic advantages from delegation. However, in oligopolistic contests according to Eq. (10) owners may also choose pure profit maximization in the case of a duopoly (i.e., n = 2), which does not hold for the case of Cournot competition (see Eq. (17) in Fershtman and Judd 1987, p. 936) .
It is also instructive to compare our results to those of Wärneryd (2000) who has also examined delegation in contests. In his model, incentives are set by paying a prize for winning the contest. As we have pointed out in the end of the previous section, we can give a similar interpretation to our model. However, whereas in his model delegation leads to less resource expenditures, in our model the opposite is true. This difference is due to a limited-liability assumption imposed by Wärneryd, which has the effect that the owners must pay a rent to the agents when delegating. Delegation therefore makes higher resource expenditures more costly for the principal. Wärneryd also briefly discusses the omission of the limited-liability assumption. But, as our results show, his conjecture that "since the agent then takes the role of a direct player in the underlying game, there is no delegation effect if such a contract is possible" (p. 151) is wrong as he ignores the commitment effect of delegation which is still present.
Furthermore, in the model of Wärneryd (2000) there is just the opposite prisoner's-dilemma situation compared to our paper. In his paper, non-delegation would be individually rational, but both principals collectively gain by delegating decisions. It is important to emphasize that the fundamental differences between our model and that of Wärneryd are not caused by the different incentive schemes but by the underlying assumptions concerning the agents' liability.
Mergers in Oligopolistic Contests
Now we introduce an additional stage of the game at which the owners decide about merging. Here, merging means that the acquired firms are shut down, 11 which is beneficial for the raider as it leads to reduced competition and, therefore, higher profits. 12 The timing of the game is as follows: 13 at the first stage, the n owners decide about merging and simultaneously offer bids for rival firms as well as a reservation price for their own firm. Each firm is allocated to the highest bid. If bidding is successful -i.e., if the highest bid is larger than the reservation price of a certain firm -the raider will pay the target owner his bid, shuts down the acquired firm(s) and stay with exactly one active firm. The next two stages correspond to the delegation game considered above in which each player knows the number of active firms. At 11 This modelling of mergers is also utilized by Salant et al. (1983) , Kamien and Zang (1990), Fauli-Oller and Motta (1996) , Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001), Ziss (2001), Huck et al. (2002) . The following merger game with simultaneous bidding has been introduced as "Centralized Game" by Kamien and Zang (1990) and has been applied to the discussion of strategic delegation in Cournot oligopoly with merging by GonzalezMaestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001) . 12 Note that the symmetric equilibrium profits given by Eq. (12) are decreasing in n.
13 More details about the merger game are given below where we derive the merger equilibria.
the second stage, the owners of the still active firms simultaneously choose incentive schemes for their managers according to Eq. (2). At the third stage, each manager perfectly observes all the chosen incentive schemes and spends resources in an oligopolistic contest to obtain a relative market share s i as described by Eq. (1).
Two effects have to be taken into account by the owners when deciding about mergers. On the one hand, merging with other firms limits competition, which is beneficial for the owner. This aspect can be called competition effect. On the other hand, merging entails costs on the raider as he has to pay the owner of the target firm his foregone profits (cost effect). Thus, we have a strict trade-off between competition and cost effect: the more firms an owner buys, the less competitive is the market, but the higher are the payments to the owners of the firms that are taken over. In addition, we have to notice that merging generates positive externalities because each remaining firm, not only the raider himself, profits from decreased competition.
Interestingly, there are three recent papers that also deal with mergers in oligopoly in a related setting. Ziss (2001) and Gonzalez-Maestre and LopezCunat (2001) consider merging in a Cournot model with strategic delegation, whereas Huck et al. (2002) discuss mergers in oligopolistic contests without strategic delegation. We will show that merging in contests with strategic delegation will lead to different results compared to the three papers mentioned above.
As a reference case, we compare the equilibrium results in the model with strategic delegation to one where decisions are directly taken by the owners. In a first step, we will search for profitable mergers as has been done by Huck et al. (2002) for contests without delegation. In a second step, we will solve the three-stage game to derive merged subgame perfect equilibria in analogy to Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001) A merger will be profitable if the profit of the merged entity exceeds the sum of the individual firms' profits without the merger. Alternatively, one could think of a single firm acquiring t ≤ n − 1 target firms by paying their owners the foregone profits. A merger will be profitable for an owner if
Here, Π r (n−t) describes the raider's ex-post profits, Π r (n) his ex-ante profits before merging, and tΠ r (n) the payments to the owners of the target firms.
The following proposition compares the profitability of merging under both regimes:
Proposition 4 (i) Under regime r = D, if n ≤ 5 all mergers will be profitable. If, however, n > 5 there will be a cut-off valuet D so that acquiring t ≥t D firms is profitable whereas the acquisition of t <t D firms is not profitable.
(ii) Under regime r = ND, if n ≤ 3 all mergers are profitable. If, however, n > 3 there will be a cut-off valuet ND so that acquiring t ≥t ND firms is profitable whereas the acquisition of t <t ND firms is not profitable. The set of profitable mergers is larger in the delegation regime (i.e.,t D ≤t ND ).
Proposition 4 shows that monopolization through merging is always profitable under either regime. The results also demonstrate that there is more merging under the delegation than under the non-delegation regime.
A key intuition to understand Proposition 4 is that there are increasing returns to scale with respect to the number of acquired firms t. On the one hand, the expenditures for acquiring t firms (cost effect) is linearly increasing in t as all acquired firms are bought for the same price. On the other hand, returns on mergers rise in t at an increasing rate as the profits are split among less firms and, in addition, competition is weakened when more and more firms are bought. Therefore it becomes clear that if any mergers are profitable, then large mergers will be. Note furthermore that a firm which acquires less than n − 1 firms delivers a public good to all other market participants. The profits of all other remaining firms are identical with the acquiring firm's profits. Hence, this firm has to bear all costs, but has to share the entire gains. As the proposition shows, for a small number of acquired firms the costs are too high relative to the gains.
When the market is quite large, it only pays for an owner to buy a lot of firms to fully exploit the competition effect. Note that even the cost effect works in the same direction: as n becomes large, the price for buying another firm given by Eq. (12) becomes small, i.e. for a very competitive situation the foregone profits of the target firms become negligible.
Next, we can compare the results of Proposition 4 to the findings of the existing literature. Huck et al. (2002) only consider the regime r = ND.
Whereas they show that without scale effects acquiring n − 1 firms is profitable, we have shown the stronger result that without delegation there is a larger set of profitable mergers even though the public good problem exists.
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Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001) discuss merging in Cournot competition with delegation using a Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas incentive scheme.
They show that -similar to our findings -given regime r = D there exists a critical fraction of merged firms so that merging of more (less) firms will be profitable (unprofitable). 16 Also similar to our model there is more merging under the delegation than under the non-delegation regime in the Cournot model.
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Up to now merging has been exogenously given. In the next step, we can look for endogenous mergers as equilibrium outcomes when all firms can simultaneously bid for others. proceeds as above with a potentially lower number of firms. At the second stage, under the delegation regime, each owner of a remaining firm chooses a compensation scheme for his manager, whereas in the non-delegation case the incentive parameter α i is set to 1 for each firm. At the third stage, under both regimes, the contest takes place among the remaining firms. Note that all remaining firms are technologically identical as we assumed constant returns to scale.
As has first been pointed out by Kamien and Zang (1990) it is not clear that all profitable mergers will take place. Owners might prefer to free-ride on the merger decisions of other firms since all firms that are still active after the merging stage of the game will profit from merging. As we will see below, the acquisition price for a firm will be higher than Π r (n) as the outside option of a target firm is now raised by the free-rider effect.
We proceed by characterizing subgame perfect equilibria of the game for both regimes. Again following Kamien and Zang (1990) and GonzalezMaestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001), we will speak of a merged subgame perfect equilibrium (or merged SPE ) if at least one owner has acquired at least one firm ex post. We will first give a necessary condition that must hold for any owner who has bought at least one firm in equilibrium. 18 Consider any merged SPE. Let m denote the number of active firms after the merging stage. Take any owner who possesses at least 2 firms in equilibrium. Let q be the number of firms this owner possesses in equilibrium (i.e., he has bought t = q − 1 firms). In this case, the total price such an owner is willing to pay for the acquired firms cannot exceed the difference between his postmerger 18 For this condition see also Kamien and Zang (1990) profits Π r (m) and his profits when he does not acquire the q − 1 firms, which is given by Π r (m + q − 1).
On the other hand, note that each owner of an acquired firm has the option not to accept an offer by raising his reservation price to a sufficiently high level. In that case, the number of active firms would be m + 1. Hence, each bid for an acquired firm must be greater or equal than Π r (m + 1).
Thus for an owner having q ≥ 2 firms in equilibrium, the following necessary condition must hold for a merged SPE:
with r²{D, ND}. Note that the difference to condition (15) for a profitable merger refers to the payment to each selling owner. In a merged SPE, this payment will be higher as any owner of an acquired firm anticipates that if he does not accept the bid for his own firm, yet other acquisitions will take place so that his profits would exceed the profits without any merger.
Condition (16) helps to restrict the set of possible equilibrium outcomes.
In a second step, we have to check for each of these candidate equilibria whether a vector of bids can be constructed so that indeed such an outcome is sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium. The following results can be derived:
Proposition 5 (i) Under regime r = D, if n ≥ 10, there will be no merged SPE. If n ≤ 9, the merged SPE are the following:
a monopoly if n²{2, 3, 4} a duopoly if n²{4, 5, 6, 7, 8} a three-firm oligopoly if n²{6, 7, 8, 9}
a four-firm oligopoly if n = 8.
(ii) Under regime r = ND, if n ≥ 5, there will be no merged SPE. If n ≤ 4, the merged SPE are the following:
a duopoly if n = {3, 4}.
(iii) In case of monopoly, payoffs under r = D and r = ND are identical.
Comparing Proposition 5 to the results of Proposition 4 shows that not all profitable mergers are part of a merged SPE. In particular, for the nondelegation case there are only two types of equilibria. The fact that there is less merging under the conditions of a simultaneous-bidding equilibrium for both regimes can be explained by the significantly higher payments for firms. Here, each buyer has to pay Π r (m + 1) instead of Π r (n) which makes merging less attractive.
Again, there is more merging under the delegation than under the nondelegation regime. A first intuition for this result comes from the fact that with increasing n profits faster tend to zero under delegation (see Eq. (12)) than under non-delegation (see Eq. (14)). This can be explained by the more aggressive competition under the delegation regime: in the symmetric equilibrium under either regime, each owner gets the market share S/n, but managers spend more resources under delegation than under non-delegation. We can also compare our results with the findings for the Cournot model. Ziss (2001, p. 481) The last proposition has shown that there are multiple merged SPE for a given number of initial firms. For example, an initial number of eight firms may lead to a duopoly, a three-firm oligopoly, or a four-firm oligopoly.
According to Proposition 2 in
However, the number of SPE can be restricted to the most plausible ones by using the dominance criterion. In analogy to Gonzalez-Maestre and LopezCunat (2001, p. 1271), we will use the concept of undominated SPE (USPE ) to restrict our attention to those merged SPE for which -given a certain number of initial firms -there is no other SPE with payoffs greater or equal for all owners and strictly greater for at least one owner. 21 We obtain the following result:
Proposition 6 For r = D, the set of merged USPE is the following:
if n = 9 the three-firm oligopoly will be the unique USPE. If n = 8 or n = 5 the duopoly will be the unique USPE.
If n = 7 or n = 6 the three-firm oligopoly and the duopoly will be USPE.
For n = 2, 3, 4 monopoly is the unique USPE.
The proposition shows that particularly merged SPE in form of small oligopolies are merged USPE. Due to the competition effect these oligopolies are the most attractive ones for the owners. The largest market form that can be sustained as an USPE is a three-firm oligopoly. However, for n = 9 a three-firm oligopoly is the unique type of merged USPE because it is the only SPE type. For n = 7 and n = 6 initial firms, both buyers and sellers earn more in the duopoly case than in the case of a three-firm oligopoly. But in the latter one there are also owners that have neither bought nor sold any firm. These owners free-ride on the merging activities of the other firms and have very high payoffs which are higher than the payoffs of certain buyers in the duopoly case.
Conclusion
Many oligopolistic markets can best be described by a contest model. This holds for oligopolies in which firms mainly compete by promotion expenditures, for R&D races, for new markets with network externalities, for recently deregulated markets, and other market situations that are highly competitive. Our results show that strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests leads to similar, but also to different outcomes compared to delegation in Cournot competition. In particular, given a market with more than two firms, strategic delegation in contests also yields a symmetric equilibrium in which each 
Proof of Proposition 1:
First, we will show uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium at the contest stage by following the approach laid out in Cornes and Hartley (2002) . Suppose
o , which gives the unique possible equilibrium value of µ i given that the total resource expenditure is M. A necessary condition for (µ 1 , µ 2 , ..., µ n ) to be a Nash equilibrium is that
To prove uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium we simply have to show that this equation has a unique solution. It is equivalent to
The right-hand side is monotonically decreasing, has value n > 1 if M = 0, but tends to 0 when M becomes large. Hence, a unique M and therefore a unique equilibrium must exist.
To show that the values of µ i given in the proposition indeed describe this equilibrium, we first check that for a manager choosing a strictly positive µ i (and thus being an element of H), (7) satisfies condition (6) given that all other managers j ∈ H\ {i} who choose strictly positive values of µ j do this according to (7). Inserting (7) yields
But this can be rearranged to
Using that
which by rearranging yields that finally (17) is equivalent to A − A −i = α i , which is clearly always the case. Note that the existence of the equilibrium is guaranteed as the managers' objective functions in (4) are strictly concave.
To obtain the condition for positive resource expenditures just check that
and this is equivalent to the given condition A −i > (m − 2) α i . If this condition does not hold, the manager will stay out of the market and chooses µ i = 0. Now consider a different manager k with α k < α i . For this manager, the left-hand side of the condition is larger (as α k in the sum is replaced by the larger α i ) and the right-hand side smaller. Hence, manager k will also choose a strictly positive value µ k . To see that in equilibrium at least the two managers with the two lowest α i s will spend positive amounts, simply note that if the manager with the second lowest α i does not choose a positive µ i the manager with the lowest α i can always reduce his own resource expenditure and be better off. Hence, there is no equilibrium with only one manager spending a positive amount.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The proof proceeds as follows: in a first step, we will analyze necessary conditions for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium. After this, we will show existence of the characterized equilibria in step 2.
Step 1: Necessary conditions
Suppose there is some equilibrium with m active firms in the set H such that m managers choose µ i > 0 according to (7). Owner i's profits are given by
Hence,
In equilibrium, we must therefore have that
which can be rearranged so that we obtain
Now, we have to distinguish two cases.
(i) First, it may be the case that 1 − 2(m−1) A = 0 which is equivalent to
In that case, we get from (20) that A = m which can only hold if m = 2, i.e. there are only two active firms. In that case we must have that
(ii) Second, we must consider the case where
Note that (20) here directly implies that the incentive parameter α i must be the same for all active firms! Hence,
As A = mα we can conclude that
when m firms are active. It is easy to check that (21) indeed then holds for m > 2. Hence, if there is any pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium when n > 2 then it will be one where m active firms all choose α * m . We now have to show that there is no equilibrium in which less than n firms are active. To do this, first, suppose that there is an equilibrium with m < n active firms. In that case, there must be at least one firm j with µ j = 0 which can only be the case if condition (18) is violated for j, i.e. for firm j to be inactive. Suppose now that, j deviates and chooses a smaller value α j = α * m . Note that any manager of a "previously" inactive firm k / ∈ H ∪ {j} will stay inactive after such a deviation. In that case, stage 2 is reached with m + 1 firms who have chosen α * m .The resource expenditures of the m + 1 active managers can then be computed from (7) as
Each active firm's profits are
These profits are positive when α * m > m m+1
. But this will be the case if
which is always the case, as the left-hand side is equal to 2. If only m < n firms are active and m > 2, then it is always beneficial for an inactive firm to deviate to a smaller value of α and get into the market.
If, however, m = 2 and n > 2 we know already that A = 2. If there is an inactive firm k, we must have that A = A −k ≤ (m − 2) α k which is equivalent to A ≤ 0 yielding a contradiction.
To sum up, if n > 2 at most a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies exists in which all owners choose α = α * n . If n = 2, however, there may be a continuum of equilibria in which α 1 + α 2 = 2 with 0 < α 1 , α 2 < 2
Step 2: Sufficient conditions for existence To prove that those equilibria indeed exist, we now proceed by showing that an owner i's objective function is quasi-concave given the proposed equilibrium strategies of the other owners. We can proceed analogously to the computation of (20) to get that the first derivative of owner i's objective function is strictly positive (negative) if and only if
(i) For n > 2, we know that A −i = (n − 1) α * n = n 2 −2n+2 n and in that case condition (22) is equivalent to
Hence, an owner's objective function is strictly increasing if α i < α * n and strictly decreasing for α i > α * n .
(ii) If n = 2, the left-hand side of condition (22) is zero and the right-hand side is equal to α i + α j − 2. Hence, owner i's profits will be increasing in α i for a given α j iff α i < 2 − α j and decreasing iff α i > 2 − α j . Therefore, all equilibria with α i + α j = 2 indeed exist.
Finally, equilibrium profits and resource expenditures can easily be computed for both cases from equations (7) and (19).
Proof of Proposition 4:
(i) First, we consider regime r = D. Substituting for Π D (n) according to (12) in (15) gives
Since the denominator is positive, the inequality can be simplified to
Note that the polynomial Λ(t) has exactly one real-valued root:
We have Λ(t) > 0 for t <t D , and Λ(t) < 0 for t >t D . It can also be checked that 0 <t D < 1 for n = 5, and 1 <t D < 2 for n = 6. The higher n the larger will be the roott D . Altogether, for n ≤ 5 we have Λ(t) < 0, ∀t ≥ 1,
i.e. merging is always profitable for an owner no matter how much firms are taken over. If, on the other hand, n > 5 then merging with t <t D other firms will not be profitable whereas an owner will gain from merging with t >t D other firms.
(ii) Now, we consider regime r = ND. From condition (15) together with (14) we obtain:
The graph of the left-hand side is a parabola open to the bottom. Hence, it is positive for values between both roots. Thus, the inequality holds for
Check that the upper root is larger than n, and the lower root is smaller than n, strictly increasing in n and larger than 1 if and only if n ≥ 2 + √ 2 (i.e.
n ≥ 4). Hence, for n ≤ 3 all mergers are profitable, whereas for n > 3 there is a cut-off valuet ND such that at leastt ND firms have to be acquired for a profitable merger.
In the next step, we have to check whether there exist equilibrium bids of the owners at the first stage of the game that make the derived duopoly and monopoly an outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium. Here, we follow the formal structure of Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001) for his firm and makes negative bids for all other firms, a N 1 -owner demands a price equal to ∞ for his firm and makes negative bids for all the other firms, and a N 2 -owner demands a price equal to ∞ for his firm, offers a price equal to Π r (m + 1) to the firms he want to buy and makes negative bids for the firms he does not want to buy. Most of the arguments given by GonzalezMaestre and Lopez-Cunat are independent of the type of competition that follows at the third stage and, therefore, also hold for our contest model. But we have to check whether a N 2 -owner wants to buy less than the predicted number of q − 1 firms.
22
Now, we come back to our two candidate equilibria above. In the monopoly case (m = 1), an owner possesses q = n ≤ 4 firms ex post. We have to check whether the monopolist has an incentive to deviate and buy less than q − 1 firms. For n = 4, the owner's payoffs in case of monopolization are
= S/4. He will gain from buying two firms instead of three if 22 This part of the proof in Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001), p. 1277, directly refers to the Cournot model and, therefore, does not apply for our contest model.
, which is not true; he will buy one instead of three firms if Π ND (3)−Π ND (2) = (S/9)−(S/4) > S/4, which is not true either. For n = 3, the owner's payoffs in case of monopolization are S − 2Π ND (2) = S/2.
Again, he will not deviate and buy only one instead two firms, because then his profits will be Π ND (2) − Π ND (2) = 0. Note that buying zero instead of q − 1 firms is already precluded by the necessary condition. This also applies to the duopoly case (m = 2) with q = 2 so that there is no deviating by buying zero instead of one firm. To summarize, the two candidate market structures do indeed describe subgame perfect equilibria.
(i) Next, regime r = D is considered. Inserting Π D (·) according to Eq. (12) and, for brevity, using the number of bought firms t = q − 1 instead of q the necessary condition (16) First, we check for a monopoly described by m = 1 and t = n − 1. Inserting into (26) gives n 3 −6n 2 +6n−4 ≤ 0. It can easily be checked that this inequality only holds for integers n ≤ 4. Hence, we have the same candidate outcome as in the non-delegation case above. Again, we have to check whether the monopolist has an incentive to buy less than n − 1 firms. For n = 4, the monopolist's payoffs are S − 3Π D (2) If the owner buys only one firm his profits will be Π D (2) − Π D (2) = 0 < S/2.
Altogether, we have the same merged SPE as under regime r = ND.
It remains to look for further equilibria by checking condition (26) for m > 1. If m = 2, condition (26) will simplify to −74 − 36t + t 2 + 4t 3 ≤ 0 which holds for integers t ≤ 3. For m = 3, (26) can be rewritten as −455 − 25t + 65t 2 + 15t 3 ≤ 0 which is met by integers t ≤ 2. If m = 4, condition (26) will be −1290 + 510t + 315t 2 + 40t 3 ≤ 0 which only holds for the integer t = 1. For all other integers m ≥ 5 condition (26) cannot hold.
Hence, besides the monopoly we have three further candidate equilibria that meet the necessary condition for a merged SPE: m = 2 with t ≤ 3 and therefore 4 ≤ n ≤ 8, m = 3 with t ≤ 2 and therefore 6 ≤ n ≤ 9, m = 4 with t = 1 and therefore n = 8.
For any of these cases to be a merged SPE, N 2 -owners must not be interested to buy τ < t instead of t firms. This condition is met if S. Again, buying zero instead of t firms is already precluded by the necessary condition. To sum up, the candidate equilibria described by (27) are indeed merged SPE.
(iii) The proofs for (i) and (ii) have shown that for n = 4 monopolist's payoffs will be S/4 ex post, and for n = 3 they will be S/2 under either regime. S. For n = 2 and r = ND, we also obtain 3 4
S.
Proof of Proposition 6:
For n = 9, the three-firm oligopoly is the only merged SPE.
For n = 8, we have three candidate USPE -the duopoly, the three-firm oligopoly, and the four-firm oligopoly. Let u +t denote the payoffs of an owner that has bought t other firms, u − the payoffs of an owner who has sold his firm, and u 0 the payoffs of an owner that is neither a buyer nor a seller. For n = 6, again the two possible merged SPE are a duopoly and a threefirm oligopoly. In the first case, both owners have bought two other firms, or one owner has bought three firms and the other owner only one firm. In the case of a three-firm oligopoly, each owner has acquired one firm, or one owner has bought two, the next owner one and the last owner zero firms.
Similar to the case of seven initial firms, both merged SPE are USPE.
For n = 5, the duopoly is the only merged SPE and, therefore, the unique merged USPE.
For n = 4, now a monopoly is also a candidate USPE. The respective payoffs are u +3 = S − 3Π D (2) = 0.25S and u − = Π D (2) = 0.25S. The only alternative equilibrium outcome is a duopoly, where one owner has acquired two and the other owner zero firms, or both owners have bought one firm.
The respective payoffs show that the duopoly is (weakly) dominated by the monopoly.
For n = 3 and n = 2, the monopoly is the only equilibrium outcome and, hence, the unique merged USPE.
